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Abstract: Using a set of interregional input-output tables built by Guilhoto (1998) for 1995 
for two Brazilian regions (Northeast and rest of the economy), the methodology developed 
by Sonis et al. (1997) is applied in the construction of a series of linkages such that it is 
possible to examine, through the nature of the internal and external interdependencies, the 
structure of trading relationships between the two regions.  The methodology uses a 
partitioned input-output system and exploits techniques that produce left and right matrix 
multipliers of the Leontief Inverse.  This procedure facilitates the classification of the types 
of synergetic interactions within a preset pair-wise hierarchy of economic linkages sub-
systems.  In general, the results show that the Northeast region has a greater dependence on 
the rest of the economy region than the rest of the economy has on the Northeast region, and 
at the same time the rest of the economy region seems to be more developed as it presents a 
more complex productive structure than the Northeast region. 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
In this paper, the methodology developed by Sonis et al. (1997) that classifies types of 
synergetic interactions is used to explore the structure of trading relations among regions.  This 
methodology is applied to a set of interregional input-output tables built by Guilhoto (1998) for 
two Brazilian regions (Northeast and rest of the economy).  The objective is to explore the 
degree to which the structure of interactions is dominated by intraregional and interregional 
components and the extent to which the interregional interactions are symmetric in magnitude.  
The two-region system that has been chosen highlights important, strategic development issues 
in an economy that is struggling to address both equity and efficiency issues in a spatial context 
(see Baer, et al., 1998).  The Northeast of Brazil has received significant, continuing 
development initiatives over the past four decades;  by 1995, the Northeast’s share in GDP had 
risen to 13.4% from 13.2% in 1960 while per capita GDP grew from 42% to 55% of the national 
average.  When attention is just directed to shares in industrial production, the Northeast 
declined from 8.3% (1959) to 7.9% (1994).  The present paper attempts to explore some 
                                                 
1 Department of Economics, Business and Sociology, ESALQ - University of São Paulo (USP), Brazil and Regional 
Economics Applications Laboratory (REAL), University of Illinois – E-mail: guilhoto@usp.br. 
2 Regional Economics Applications Laboratory (REAL), University of Illinois. 
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structural reasons that might shed light on this problem;  while the focus will be on the economic 
structure of the Northeast and the Rest of Brazil (hereafter, NE and RB respectively) at one point 
in time, 1995, the findings will reflect long-term structural issues that have remained unresolved. 
In the next section the theoretical background will be presented.  In the third section the theory 
will be applied to the Brazilian interregional tables, while in the fourth section policy 
interpretations will be reviewed prior to the presentation of some concluding comments in the 
final section. 
 
II. Theoretical Background4 
Consider a two-region, mutually exclusive division of a national economy.  Following the 
adaptation of the Dixit-Stiglitz model by Fujita et al., (1999) assume that there are two goods, a 
tradable and a nontradable, and that there are no external to the national economy interactions.  
Further assume that labor employed in the tradable commodity is mobile between regions and 
that labor moves to regions paying higher than average real wages.  Given a transportation costs 
structure in which costs are assumed to be a linear increasing function of distance, then it can be 
shown that the equilibrium distribution of production will depend in large part on the magnitude 
of the transportation costs and their interaction with increasing returns at the firm level and labor 
mobility.  Fujita et al. (1999) show that with high transportation costs there will be a tendency 
for production to be divided between the two regions;  if labor mobility is limited (by higher 
transportation or search costs), and the transportation costs are reduced, there is a tendency to 
develop a core-periphery outcome in which the tradable good becomes concentrated in one of 
the two regions. 
Obviously, with a more complex system in which goods are all tradable to some extent, the 
search for greater variety by consumers may tend to exacerbate concentration tendencies, 
tendencies that will be reinforced by the existence of increasing returns.  The competition 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Bar Ilan University, Israel, and Regional Economics Applications Laboratory (REAL), University of Illinois. 
4 This section draws heavily on Sonis, Hewings, and Miyazawa (1997). 
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between the NE and RB presents a very strikingly familiar scenario.  Transportation costs 
between NE and RB are high but not high enough to create a protective, spatially monopolistic 
market in the NE;  producers in the RB have been able to exploit scale economies and penetrate 
the NE market to the exclusion of NE producers.  In this paper, the resultant interregional 
structure will be explored and interpreted using a set of input-output tables. 






⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (1) 
where 11A  and 22A  are the quadrat matrices of direct inputs within the first and second regions, 
and 12A  and 21A  are the rectangular matrices showing the direct inputs purchased by the second 
region and vice versa.  
The building blocks of the pair-wise hierarchies of sub-systems of intra/interregional linkages of 
the block-matrix Input-Output system are the four matrices 11, 12 21 22,  and A A A A , corresponding to 
four basic block-matrices:  
 11 1211 12 21 22
21 22
0 0 0 00 0
= ;   = ;   = ;   =
0 00 0 0 0
A A
A A A A
A A
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (2) 
This paper will usually consider the decomposition of the block-matrix (1) into the sum of two 
block-matrices, such that each of them is the sum of the block-matrices (2) 11, 12 21 22,  and A A A A .  
From (1), 14 types of pair-wise hierarchies of economic sub-systems can be identified by the 
decompositions of the matrix of the block-matrix A (see Figure 1 and Table A2 in the appendix). 
A set of inner regional multipliers, the set of inverse matrices that are the "building blocks" of 
the synergetic interactions between the economic sub-systems are presented in table A1 in the 
appendix.  Hereafter, some comments are provided on the entries in this table (the bold 
numbering refers to the corresponding entries in this table). 
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1. The matrices -11 11=( )B I A− and 12 22=( )B I A −−  represent the Miyazawa internal matrix 
multipliers of the first and second regions showing the interindustrial propagation effects within 
each region, while the matrices, 21 1 1 12 12 2 2 21, , , A B B A A B B A  show the induced effects on output or 
input activities in the two regions. 
2. The expressions 
 1 11 12 2 21 2 22 21 1 12= ,   = S I A A B A S I A A B A− − − −  (3) 
are usually referred to as the Schur complements.  The inverses, 1D  and 2D  of the Schur 
complements (3) are referred to as the Schur inverses for the first and second regions.  They 
represent the enlarged Leontief inverse for one region revealing the induced economic influence 
of the other region; i.e., the Schur inverses represent total propagation effects in the first and 
second regions. 
3. Miyazawa (1966) introduced the concept of left and right external matrix multipliers of the 
first and second regions, 11 11 22 22, , ,
L R L RD D D D .  These multipliers are incorporated in the 
multiplicative decompositions of the Schur inverses and they represent the total propagation 
effects in the first and second regions as the products of internal and external regional matrix 
multipliers. 
4, 5. By introducing the abbreviated Schur inverses, 11 22,D D , and the left and right induced 
internal multipliers for the first and second regions, 1 1 2 2, , ,
L R L RB B B B , one can obtain the 
multiplicative decompositions of the Schur inverses: 
 1 1 11 11 1 2 2 22 22 2= = ;    = =
L R L RD B D D B D B D D B  (4) 
and their corresponding additive representations. 
6-10. The formulae for this group of multipliers can be obtained by considering the block-
matrices: 
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 11 12 12 12
21 21 22 21
0 0
= ,   = ,   =
0 0
A A A A
M N S
A A A A
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (5) 
Those represent the backward and forward linkages of the first region, the second region and the 
interregional relations of both regions. 
The following Schur inverse 
 * 11 11 12 21=( )D I A A A
−− −  (6) 
may be referred to as the enlarged Leontief inverse, and the inverses 
 * 1 * 111 1 12 21 11 12 21 1=( ) ;   =( )
L RD I B A A D I A A B− −− −  (7) 
are called the left and right subjoined inverse matrix multipliers.  
Consider the hierarchy of Input-Output sub-systems represented by the decomposition 
1 2 = +A A A .  Introducing the Leontief block-inverse 
1( )= =( )L A L I A −− and the Leontief block-
inverse 11 1 1( )= =( )L A L I A
−− corresponding to the first sub-system, the outer left and right block-
matrix multipliers LM  and RM  are defined by equalities: 
 1 1= =R LL L M M L  (8) 
The definition (8) implies that: 
 11 1 2= ( )=( )LM L I A I L A
−− −  (9) 
 11 2 1=( ) =( )RM I A L I A L
−− −  (10) 
In this paper, the following form of the Leontief block-inverse will be used: 
  1 1 12 2
2 21 1 2
=
D D A B
L
D A B D
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (11) 
This expression can be verified by direct matrix multiplication, using definitions of the Schur 
inverses and their properties (see table A1, entries 1 and 2).  Further, the application of (9), (10) 
and (11) will be directed towards the derivation of a taxonomy of synergetic interactions 
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between the two regions.  The results are presented in the first and second levels of table A2, 
while figure 1 shows the schematic representation of the possible forms of the A1 matrices. 
<insert figure 1 here> 
Consider the hierarchy of input-output sub-systems represented by the decomposition 
1 2 = + A A A  and their Leontief block-inverse 1( ) =  = ( )L A L I A −−  and the Leontief block-inverse 
1
1 1 1( ) = = ( )L A L I A
−−  corresponding to the first sub-system.  The multiplicative decomposition 
of the Leontief inverse 1 1 = = R LL L M M L  can be converted to the sum: 
 1 1 1 1 = + ( ) = + ( )L RL L M I L L L M I− −  (12) 
If f is the vector of final demand and x is the vector of gross output, then the decomposition (12) 
generates the decomposition of gross output into two parts: 1 1=  x L f  and the increment 
1 =  - Dx x x .  Such decomposition is important for the empirical analysis of the structure of actual 
gross output.  In the second level of table A2, the classification is revealed of possible additive 
decompositions of the Leontief block-inverse for all decompositions of input-output system into 
pair-vise hierarchies. 
While 14 types of pair-wise hierarchies of economic linkages have been developed (figure 1 and 
table A2), it is possible to suggest a typology of categories into which these types may be placed.  
The following characterization is suggested: 
1. backward linkage type (VI, IX): power of dispersion 
2. forward linkage type (V, X): sensitivity of dispersion 
3. intra- and inter- linkages type (VII, VIII): internal and external dispersion 
4. isolated region vs. the rest of the economy interactions style (I, XIV, IV, XI) 
5. triangular sub-system vs. the interregional interactions style (II, XIII, III, XII). 
By viewing the system of hierarchies of linkages in this fashion, it will be possible to provide 
new insights into the properties of the structures that are revealed.  For example, the types 
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allocated to category 5 reflect structures that are based on order and circulation.  Furthermore, 
these partitioned input-output systems can distinguish among the various types of dispersion 
(such as 1, 2 and 3) and among the various patterns of interregional interactions (such as 4 and 
5).  Essentially, the 5 categories and 14 types of pair-wise hierarchies of economic linkages 
provide the opportunity to select according to the special qualities of each region’s activities and 
for the type of problem at hand; in essence, the option exists for the basis of a typology of 
economy types based on hierarchical structure. 
 
III.  An Application to Brazil 
Using a set of interregional input-output tables built by Guilhoto (1998) at the level of 40 sectors 
for the year of 1995 for 2 Brazilian regions (NE - Region 1 - and the rest of the economy - 
Region 2), the methodology presented in section II is applied, and the results are presented in 
tables 3 to 5 and figures 2 to 4. 
<<insert table 1 here>> 
Table 1 illustrates the results taking into consideration the vector f of final demand and the 
vector x of gross output; then the gross output is decomposed into two parts: 1 1=  x L f  and the 
increment 1 =  - Dx x x .  The values for x and 1x are added for all sectors in regions 1 and 2 such 
that it is possible to estimate the contribution of each interaction to the total production in each 
region.  As the shares of x1 in x take also into consideration the value of the final demand, it is 
interesting to isolate the shares of the final demand in each region to reveal how the pair-wise 
interaction takes place in the regions. 
Focusing on the results presented into table 1, one can see that the value of the final demand in 
region 1 (NE) is responsible for 63.46 % of the production in this region (the remaining 36.54% 
is generated in the process of production) while for region 2 (RB), this value is 60.25 % (39.75 
% in the process of production).  In a certain sense this is an indication that the rest of the 
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economy is more developed than the NE region as the internal transactions in region 2 are 
responsible for a greater share of the total production than is the case in region 1. 
<<insert figure 2 here>> 
In figure 2, it is possible to see how intermediation in each region contributes to total production.  
For the NE region, of the 36.54% share of total production accounted for by intermediate 
demand, 66.03% of it is the result of intraregional demand, while 11.01% is the result of the NE 
region selling to the RB.  Starting from the isolated regions (block matrices) and then adding the 
interactions among them it is possible to measure how each interaction adds to the total 
production.  These results are presented in table 2 and figure 3 for the NE and in table 3 and 
figure 4 for RB. 
<<insert tables 2, 3 and figures 3, 4 here>> 
Excluding final demand, the following summaries may be provided: 
Case I (A11): when the NE region isolated, this value shows how much of the internal production 
is due to relations only inside the region; in this case, the value is 24.13%, which represents 
66.03% of the production in the productive process (ppp); 
Case II (A12): the purchases made by the industries in the RB region from the NE region 
generate 4.02% of the production in the NE region, 11.01% of the ppp, and by itself without 
having any interaction with the other block matrices generates no further production in the RB; 
Case III (A21): the purchases made by the industries in the NE region from the RB region 
generate 0.39% of the production in the RB region, 0.99% of the ppp, and by itself without 
having any interaction with the other block matrices generates no further production in the NE 
region; 
Case IV (A22): when the RB region is isolated, this value shows how much of the internal 
production is due to the relations only inside the region and in this case it is 38.65%, 97.24 % of 
the ppp; 
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Case V (A11 and A12): from the sales of production that the industries in the NE region sell to the 
production process of both regions, generated a gross value of 30.30% of the production is 
generated in the NE region, adding 5.88% to the ppp, and 0.00 % in the RB region, as there is no 
feedback among the regions; 
Case VI (A11 and A21): from the interactions of the inputs that the industries in the NE region buy 
from both regions, a gross value of 24.13% of the production in this region is generated, which 
means a no addition to the ppp, and 0.51% of the production in the RB region, adding 0.30% to 
the ppp of this region; 
Case VII (A11 and A22): when both regions are isolated, with no transactions between them, this 
values shows how much of the internal production is due to the relations only inside each region 
and in this case they contribute a gross value of 24.13% for the NE region and a gross value of 
38.65% for the RB region, with no addition to the ppp of both regions; 
Case VIII (A12 and A21): considering only the interregional flows among regions one has a gross 
value of 4.07% of the production in the NE region is due to these flows, adding 0.13% to the 
ppp, while for the RB region this gross value is 0.42%, adding 0.08% to the ppp, showing again 
a greater dependence of the production in the NE region in the interrelations among the regions; 
Case IX (A12 and A22): from the interactions of the inputs that the industries in the RB region buy 
from both regions, a gross value of 38.65% of the production in this region can be revealed, with 
no addition to the ppp, and a gross value of 7.89% of the production in the NE region, adding 
10.59% to the ppp.  When these results are compared with the ones presented in Case VI, this 
shows a greater dependence of the NE region on the production process of the RB region; 
Case X (A21 and A22): from the sales of production that the industries in the RB region sell to the 
production process of both regions, a gross value of 39.37% of the production in the RB region 
is obtained, adding 0.82% to the ppp, and  0.00% in the NE region as there is virtually no 
feedback among the regions, in this case showing a greater value of internal multipliers in the 
RB region than in the NE region; 
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Case XI (A11, A12 and A21): taking the relations inside the NE region and the sales and purchases 
that it makes from the RB region, a gross value of 30.40% of the production in this region is 
accounted for, adding 0.15% to the ppp, and a gross value of 0.56% in the RB region, adding 
0.03% to the ppp, values greater than the ones presented in case VI since more transactions are 
now being taking into consideration; 
Case XII (A11, A12 and A22): taking the relations inside both regions and the purchases that the 
NE region makes from the RB region, a gross value of 36.33% of the production in the NE 
region is generated, adding 5.92% to the ppp, and a gross value of 38.65% in the RB region, with 
no addition to the ppp; 
Case XIII (A11, A21 and A22): taking the relations inside both regions and the purchases that the 
NE region makes from the RB region, a gross values of 24.13% of the production in the NE 
region can be ascertained, with no addition to the ppp, and a gross value of  39.59% in the RB 
region, adding 0.26% to the ppp; 
Case XIV (A12, A21 and A22): taking the relations inside the RB region and the sales and 
purchases that it makes from the NE region, a gross value of 39.49% of the production in this 
region is generated, adding 0.21% to the ppp, and a gross value of 7.99% in the NE region, 
adding 0.13% to the ppp, values greater than the ones presented in case IX since more 
transactions are now being taking into consideration. 
Case XV (A11, A12, A21 and A22): this case is not displayed in table 2 because it considers all the 
interactions in the economy, it is listed here only to call attention for the contribution that this 
last case has to the ppp, i.e., adding 0.14% to the ppp in the NE region and 0.08% to the ppp in 
the RB region. 
Tables 2 and 3 and figures 3 and 4 show for both regions the contribution that each block matrix 
in each pair wise decomposition has to the ppp; they also present the total contribution of each 
block matrix.  From these data, it is possible to see a greater dependence of the NE region on the 
RB region, for while 71.03% of the ppp in the NE region is due to interactions inside the region, 
the corresponding value for the RB region is 97.82%.  Hence, it is possible to observe and to 
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measure how the relations between the 2 Brazilian regions take place. The NE region has a 
greater dependence on the rest of the economy region than the rest of the economy has on the NE 
region, and at the same time the rest of the economy region seems to be more developed as it 
presents a more complex productive structure than the NE region. 
IV Policy Implications 
One of the major changes that has occurred within the economic structure of many economies is 
the apparent increase in specialization and diversification at the same time.  Overall, regional 
economies are becoming more diversified, in terms of their macro structure.  However, 
establishments (plants) within sectors are becoming more specialized, responding in large part to 
consumer demands for greater product variety.  As a result, trade between regions tends to be 
concentrated in intraindustry rather than interdindustry trade (see Krugman, 1990).  However, 
these developments are associated with trade between regions with similar levels of per capita 
income and with excellent transportation connections.  Neither is the case for the NE-RB 
interaction; transportation costs are low enough to allow penetration from the other region but 
not sufficiently low enough to allow for the full realization of the benefits of increasing returns.  
Having discerned significant imbalances in the trading relationships and the complexity of 
internal to the region intermediation, the next issue centers on the policy implications.  
Comparative analysis recently conducted for the NE economy with that of the Midwest of the 
US (Magalhães et al., 2000) revealed dramatically significant differences in the level and 
volume of interactions for two regions.  While both regions account for about the same 
percentage of their nation’s GDP, the Midwest US economy’s GDP per capita is above the 
national average in contrast to the NE Brazil economy (about 55% of the Brazil GDP per capita).  
While the Midwest region is highly connected to the rest of the US economy (with an overall 
positive balance of trade), a huge volume of interactions flow between the member states;  in the 
NE, the level of internal intermediation is lower and there is a negative balance of trade (imports 
> exports) with the RB.  Clearly, appeals to development of clusters of activities to enhance the 
level of intermediation may not reflect the realities of an economy whose capacity to sustain 
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further levels of activity may be circumscribed by poor internal transportation connectivities that 
reduce the effective demand for goods and services. 
In addition, as noted by Baer et al. (1998), the promotion of more open markets within the 
context of WTO guidelines may make traditional forms of market intervention less feasible;  in 
any case, the record from prior interventions suggest that the prior policies had little success in 
significantly changing the structure of the NE region’s economy to ensure that it would be in a 
position to compete successfully in the national and international marketplace in the next several 
decades. 
V. Conclusions 
The main contribution of this paper was to show, using different synergetic interactions, that it is 
possible to analyze and to measure how the trading relationship between two regions takes place.  
This was accomplished using a two-region interregional input-output table constructed for the 
Brazilian economy for the year of 1995.  From the results, it was possible to see that NE region 
has a greater dependence on the rest of the economy region than the rest of the economy has on 
the NE region, and at the same time the rest of the economy region seems to be more developed 
as it presents a more complex productive structure than the NE region. 
This study was conducted using one point in time and two regions; it would be interesting to 
compare how the relations between the two regions change trough time and also how these 
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Table A1: Inner Regional Multipliers and Their Properties 
 
1. Internal regional multipliers: 
1 1
1 11 2 22=( - ) ;     =( - )B I A B I A
− −  
  
2. Schur complements and Schur inverses: 
1 11 12 2 21 2 22 21 1 12
1 1
1 11 12 2 21 2 22 21 1 12
= - - ;                      = - -
=( - - ) ;               =( - - )
S I A A B A S I A A B A
D I A A B A D I A A B A− −
 
  
3. Left and right Miyazawa external matrix multipliers: 
1 1
11 1 12 2 21 22 2 21 1 12
1 1
11 12 2 21 1 22 21 1 12 2
=( - ) ;               =( - )
= ( - ) ;              =( - )
L L
R R
D I B A B A D I B A B A
D I A B A B D I A B A B
− −
− −  
Main Properties:  
1 1 11 11 1 2 2 22 22 2= = ;                          = =
R L R LD B D D B D B D D B  
  
4. Abbreviated Schur inverses: 
1 1
11 12 2 21 22 21 1 12=( - ) ;                     =( - )D I A B A D I A B A
− −  
  
5. Left and right induced internal multipliers:  
1 1
1 11 11 2 22 22
1 1
1 11 11 2 22 22
=( - ) ;                  =( - )
=( - ) ;                  =( - )
L L
R R
B I D A B I D A
B I A D B I A D
− −
− −  
Main Properties:  
1 1 11 11 1 2 2 22 22 2= = ;               = =
L R L RD B D D B D B D D B  
  
6. Enlarged Leontief inverses: 
* 1 * 1
1 11 12 21 ; 2 22 21 12=( - - )       =( - - )D I A A A D I A A A
− −  
 
  
7. Induced external multipliers: 
* 1 * 1
11 12 21 22 21 12=( - ) ;                 =( - )D I A A D I A A
− −  
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
 
9. Left and right subjoined inverses:   
* 1 * 1
11 1 12 21 22 2 21 12
* 1 * 1
11 12 21 1 22 21 12 2
=( - ) ;                      =( - )
=( - )                        =( - )
L L
R R
D I B A A D I B A A
D I A A B D I A A B
− −
− −  
Main Properties:  
* * * * * *
1 1 11 11 1 2 2 22 22 2= = ;                        = =
R L R LD B D D B D B D D B  
  
10.  Left and right induced subjoined inverses:   
** 1 ** 1
11 11 11 12 2 22 21 22 22 22 21 1 11 12
** 1 ** 1
11 11 12 2 22 21 11 22 22 21 1 11 12 22
=[ - ( )] ;             =[ - ( )] ;     
=[ -( - ) ] ;              =[ -( - ) ]
L L
R R
D I D A A B A A D I D A A B A A





Main Properties:  
* ** ** * ** **
1 11 11 11 11 2 22 22 22 22 = = ;                                = =
L R L RD D D D D D D D D D  
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 Taxonomy of Synergetic Interactions between Economic Sub-Systems 
[Each entry consists of two levels: in the first level, a description of the structure and the corresponding 
form of the A1 matrix is shown.  In the second level the additive decompositions of the Leontief block-
matrix are shown] 
 
Level 1  Description Form of the 1A  matrix 
Level 2 ( ) ( )1 1 1 1L RL L M I L L L M I= + − = + −  
 









⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 




 = + .
0 0 0
I IB B A A B
L D I
I I SI I
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
II. The order replaced hierarchy of interregional 









⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
1 1 12 2 1 1212




D I S A B S AI A
L
D A B I SI
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
III. The order replaced hierarchy of interregional 









⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
1 1 12 2




I D I S A B
L
A I D A B S A I S
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤−⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
IV. The order replaced hierarchy of backward and 

















I I II S I
L D
B B A A BI I
⎡ ⎤−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
V. Hierarchy of forward linkages of first and second 
regions   11 121= :0 0
A A
A
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
1 1 12 1 12
2 21 1 2  = + 0
B B A B A
L D A B I S
I I
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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Table A2 (Continued) 















 = + 
B B A
L D A B I
A B I I S
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦−⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 









⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
: 
1 1 12 2 21 22 1




B D A B A I A B
B D A B I A A B
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 









⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
* * *
*11 11 12 1 12 121 11 11
2 22 22* *




D D A I B A I AD A D
L D A D
D A D B A I A I
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 


















I A B S
L D I A B
B B A
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 






⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
1 1 12 2




L D I S A B
B A B B A
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
XI. The hierarchy of backward and forward linkages of 







⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
* *
1 1 12 1 12
2 22 22 21 1*
21 1 22
 = +
D D A B A
L D D A A B I
A D D I
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
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Table A2 (Continued) 
 
XII. The hierarchy of upper triangular sub system 







⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
1 1 12 2 1 12




B B A B B A
L D A B I A B
B I
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
XIII. The hierarchy of lower triangular sub system 







⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
1
1 12 2 21 1




L D A B A B I
B AB A B B
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
XIV. Hierarchy of the rest of economy versus  second 











11 11 1 12* *
2 212 21 2
1
 = + 2
D A D
L D A D I A B
B AD A D
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
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of x1 in x 
NE 
Share (%) 
of x1 in x 
Rest of BR
Share (%) 
of (x1-f) in x
NE 
Share (%) 
of (x1-f) in x 
Rest of BR
Share (%) 
of  f in x  
NE 
Share (%) 
of f in x  
Rest of BR
I 87.59 60.25 24.13 0.00 63.46 60.25
II 67.49 60.25 4.02 0.00 63.46 60.25 
III 63.46 60.64 0.00 0.39 63.46 60.25
IV 63.46 98.90 0.00 38.65 63.46 60.25 
V 93.76 60.25 30.30 0.00 63.46 60.25 
VI 87.59 60.76 24.13 0.51 63.46 60.25 
VII 87.59 98.90 24.13 38.65 63.46 60.25 
VIII 67.54 60.67 4.07 0.42 63.46 60.25
IX 71.36 98.90 7.89 38.65 63.46 60.25 
X 63.46 99.62 0.00 39.37 63.46 60.25 
XI 93.87 60.81 30.40 0.56 63.46 60.25 
XII 99.79 98.90 36.33 38.65 63.46 60.25 
XIII 87.59 99.84 24.13 39.59 63.46 60.25
XIV 71.45 99.74 7.99 39.49 63.46 60.25 
Source: Estimated by the authors 
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I 66.03 66.03 - - - 
II 11.01 - 11.01 - - 
III - - - - - 
IV - - - - - 
V 5.88 2.94 2.94 - - 
VI - - - - - 
VII - - - - - 
VIII 0.13 - 0.07 0.07 - 
IX 10.59 - 5.30 - 5.30 
X - - - - - 
XI 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.05 - 
XII 5.92 1.97 1.97 - 1.97 
XIII - - - - - 
XIV 0.13 - 0.04 0.04 0.04 
XV 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Total 100.00 71.03 21.42 0.20 7.35 
Source: Estimated by the authors 
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I - - - - - 
II - - - - - 
III 0.99 - - 0.99 - 
IV 97.24 - - - 97.24
V - - - - - 
VI 0.30 0.15 - 0.15 - 
VII - - - - - 
VIII 0.08 - 0.04 0.04 - 
IX - - - - - 
X 0.82 - - 0.41 0.41 
XI 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 - 
XII - - - - - 
XIII 0.26 0.09 - 0.09 0.09 
XIV 0.21 - 0.07 0.07 0.07 
XV 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Total 100.00 0.27 0.14 1.77 97.82 
Source: Estimated by the authors 
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Figure 1: Schematic Representation of the Possible Forms of the A1 Matrix 
 
 I  II III IV  V  
 •    •        • • 
       •    •     
                
 VI  VII VIII IX  X  
 •   •    •   •     
 •    •  •    •  • • 
               
 XI  XII XIII XIV  XV  
 • •  • •  •    •  • • 
 •    •  • •  • •  • • 
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NE 66.03 11.01 0.00 0.00 5.88 0.00 0.00 0.13 10.59 0.00 0.15 5.92 0.00 0.13 0.14
RB 0.00 0.00 0.99 97.24 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.82 0.03 0.00 0.26 0.21 0.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Source: Tables 1, 2, and 3 
Figure 2 
Results of the Synergetic Interactions Between the NE and the RB Regions 
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A11 A12 A21 A22
Block Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Source: Table 2 
Figure 3 
Contribution (%) of Each Pair-Wise and Block Matrix to the Total Share of (x1-f) in x – NE 
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A11 A12 A21 A22
Block Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Source: Table 3 
Figure 4 
Contribution (%) of Each Pair-Wise and Block Matrix to the Total Share of (x1-f) in x – RB 
 
